We publish this translation of an article from issue 16 of Klassenstandpunkt, which was sent to us:

First critical remarks about the role of the Communist Party of the Philippines in the International Communist Movement

Before a few years ago some internationalist comrades began to spread the word of the world’s people's wars in the FRG, these were relatively unknown in this country (with maybe the people’s war in Turkey being an exception). Now that these armed struggles around the world, under the leadership of Communist parties, have gained some popularity and shown that Maoism is not the example of Prachanda in Nepal - meaning surrender - but it’s struggle, it’s also important to deal with the differences.

It would be wrong to consider them all as "the same" and to look only at their quantitative sides. Every people's war is led by a Communist Party, and in the current situation each Communist Party has not only one specific line in its respective country, but sometimes also very different basic positions. All people's wars, all the struggles of the international proletariat and the peoples of the world deserve our proletarian internationalist support. Nevertheless, we must always keep an eye on the qualitative character of the forces that guide the different struggles. Otherwise, our anti-imperialism would not have a Marxist basis, but would become its own program. We recall what Mariátegui taught us: "We are anti-imperialists because we are Marxists, because we are revolutionaries, because we oppose capitalism with socialism, an antagonistic system called upon to transcend it"1

The ideological struggle, as well internationally, has always been one of the good traditions of the International Communist Movement. It is an important drive motor of the unification of communist parties and organizations worldwide. It conduces the exchange of experiences and the fight against wrong ideas, criteria, points of view and lines. We understand this article in this good tradition, in which we address some of the first aspects which, in our opinion, are to be criticized along the line of the Communist Party of Democracy Philippines (CPPh), based on the ideology, position, and method of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, principally Maoism.

Of course, we treat the documents of the Communist Party of the Philippines as documents written by people who know exactly what they are doing and provide the most accurate representation of their theory and practice. Thus, the official party documents are not separate from the reality of the Philippines, but a representation of reality. Naturally, by the party itself. Accordingly, a critique of this position on the reality of the people's war is to be unfold. This should not be denied by bringing the "argument": "You do not know the reality there!".

Whether or not we have ever been to the Philippines, it can’t be argued that the official CPPh documents are not in line with their practice. If so, we would not talk about a Communist Party, but about a bunch of charlatans. And we don’t believe that at all.

The CPPh and Maoism

Since in the FRG some right-wing liquidators have started propagating the CPPh as if it were THE Maoist party in the world, it’s worth taking a look at the history of the CPPh and its acceptance of Maoism.

The documents of the CPPh are extremely contradictory in this question. Although some documents from the founding period in 1968 or shortly after already speak of Marxism-Leninism-Mao-Zedong-Thought, there are also at least as many documents in which only Marxism-Leninism is mentioned. One of these documents is "Brief Review of the History of the Communist Party of the Philippines" of 1988. Here the party speaks exclusively of Marxism-Leninism, as the founding unit of the CPPh, and throughout the document, Chairman Mao is not mentioned even once. His life and work not even hinted. Five years later, the party published a document entitled „Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as Guide to the Philippine Revolution“. This document explains:

“Proletarian revolutionary cadres reestablished the Communist Party of the Philippines on December 26, 1968 and proclaimed Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as their theoretical guide.“

This illustrates how the party directly contradicts itself in questions of its ideological unity just when it was founded.

Just to compare how it was ideologically elsewhere in the world in this period; here are some key facts: In 1969, one year after the reestablishment of the CPPh, the Communist Party of Peru (CPP) adopted Mao Tse-Tung Thought as its unitary base, and on that basis launched the People's War in Peru in 1980, accomplished a higher understanding of the work of Chairman Mao, and determined in 1982 that Marxism-Leninism-Maoism was the third stage of Marxism. In 1983, on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the birth of Chairman Mao, the CPP launched the campaign for Maoism and in 1988 published the document "On Marxism-Leninism-Maoism" in which Chairman Gonzalo masterfully defined and systematized Maoism.

On the occasion of the 100th birthday of Chairman Mao, the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) declared Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as its ideological unity base in 1993. With all their problems, and despite the extremely damaging role of the Revolutionary Communist Party USA headed by Bob Avakian, a number of parties and organizations around the world have achieved basic unity based on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, while the CPPh was still partly speaking of Marxism-Leninism and partly of Mao-Zedong Thought.

The CPPh documents repeatedly reveal their eclectic understanding of Marxism. In the document "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Carry the Revolution Forward" of 1991, as well as in the new program that was accepted at the second party congress in 2016, the CPPh speaks of the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Ho.

“The Party resolutely adheres to the proletarian revolutionary standpoint, viewpoint and method and ceaselessly studies the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Ho and other great communist thinkers and leaders.”2

“It [the CPPh] learns basic principles from the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Ho and other great communist thinkers and leaders [...]”3

The question that needs to be asked is: what are the "basic principles of the teachings" of Ho Chi Minh? Usually, the enumeration of the classics of Marxism represents an increasing development of the truth of Marxism beginning with Marx. Then, the question is, which higher development Ho Chi Minh after Chairman Mao has contributed to Marxism? Although Ho Chi Minh was the leader of the heroic resistance of the Vietnamese people with his Communist Party, it was also his ideological and political weaknesses that later caused the Vietnamese revolution to go awry and that the country fell into the hands of soviet social imperialism (keyword: raid on the Democratic Kampuchea in 1978). Because Ho Chi Minh represented a centrist position in the fight against the then contemporary revisionism Khrushchev, which manifested above all in the struggle between the Communist Party of China (CPCh) and the at that time already revisionist leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In his will4, he pleaded above all for a reconciliation of the parties, thus for a reconciliation with revisionism. In this sense it can be said, that one should learn from Ho Chi Minh, however, as Chairman Mao puts it, learn from his negative example so that the same mistakes won’t be made again.

But back to the actual question - when exactly did the CPPh actually accept Maoism as its unity base? Unfortunately, this question has to be left unanswered, because we are not aware of a single document describing or dating this resolution in the usually extensive and (in the Internet) easy to find party literature. Sometime between 1996 and 2009 can be determined, in between, unfortunately we lost track. But we would be glad if someone could save us from our ignorance by giving us a hint, where a corresponding document can be found. This is not a question of pedantry, the ideological unity basis is absolutely no small matter for a party. The whole political and organizational work of the party stands or falls with it, in the most extreme case it even changes its color. But the fact that the CPPh doesn’t appear to have any clarity on this issue is reflected not only in the documents of 1988 and 1993 cited above, which really confuse the question of the unity base in the reestablishment of the party. This question is even in the last years still actively confused by founding chairman Jose Maria Sison. In an interview in 2014 he said:

“There is no difference in content between Mao Zedong Thought and Maoism. When the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPPh) used the phrase Mao Zedong Thought in 1969, all the major theoretical and practical achievements of Comrade Mao were encompassed. They are also encompassed in the word, Maoism, used by the CPP since the early 1990s. The phrase Marxism-Leninism-Maoism evokes continuity and advance. The appearance of the word Maoism is symmetrical to Marxism and Leninism.“5

The fact that the CPPh has been using the term Maoism since the early 1990s is not known to us, as already described. But we don’t want to limit ourselves to getting stopped by these apparent formalities. Because even if we are not friends of playings with semantics, we have to contradict Sison's sloppy wording here. Because Maoism is not just a "word", but a definition. Just as little are "Marxism and Leninism" only words6. But now to Sison's claim that there is no substantive difference between Mao Tse Tung thought and Maoism. The CPCh's 9th Congress would certainly contradict it, because it made the definition of Mao Zedong Thought (in the tough two-line struggle against the right wing of the party). If both had the same content, we would not need two terms, then we could also speak of Lenin thought or Marx thought, but we just don’t do that, because Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is a closed system. And the question of "ism" means precisely that systematization and its closed development in all three components of Marxism to a higher level and to a higher truth and not merely individual contributions, as the concept "thought" implies in this case. The CPP summed this up in 1988 as follows:

While Marxism-Leninism has achieved recognition of its universal validity, Maoism is not fully recognized as a third stage. While some reject it as a whole, others tend to recognize it only as "Mao Tse-tung thought." And in both cases, with the obvious differences between them, they essentially negate the contribution to the general development of Marxism made by Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. To disavow Maoism's "ism" character is to deny its universal validity and, consequently, to deny its status as the third, new, and superior stage of the ideology of the international proletariat: Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, principally Maoism, which we uphold, defend and apply.7

It is significant how much you can do wrong in such a small paragraph, and we also ask ourselves what should be "symmetrical to Marxism and Leninism" in the appearance of the "word Maoism", but this geometry lesson can certainly be continued at a later date.

The CPPh and the international line

Politics is the application of the ideology in the class struggle. The communists do their work in the service of the world proletarian revolution. These two things are among the truisms of the International Communist Movement. This also means that, of course, the international situation at any specific moment has a special significance for the Communist Parties of the world, and that they must take a stand in the international class struggle. Of course, this also requires a correct analysis of the epoch in which we find ourselves. But here the ideological weakness of the CPPh already clearly reflects itself. As Lenin analyzed, today we are in the last stage of capitalism, imperialism. The CPPh faces this with its own analysis, because they speak of imperialism principally when it comes to the dominance of the USA in the Philippines. When it comes to the stage of development of today's society, they usually speak of the "world capitalist system." This analysis (since it’s not just a word to directly anticipate Sison's argumentation) can be found from the 1970's documents until today. In doing so, they negate the analysis of Lenin's imperialism and its deepening by Chairman Mao, leaving the flank open for revisionist standpoints.

An important question in the evaluation of the state of the world for the ICM is, among other things, the question of whether there are socialist states in the world or not. The revisionist coup in China and the position of the Communists was an important demarcation line around the world after the death of Chairman Mao. But instead of condemning the coup and the restoration of capitalism in China and its social-imperialist character, the CPPh meanders between a clear statement. As late as 1991, the party posed the question like this:

Whether China remains socialist or not, it has built up a powerful industrial capacity and is among the countries in the region with their political independence and a higher capacity for resisting U.S. or Japanese imperialism than before World War II. China is the largest imponderable factor in the forthcoming rivalry between the United States and Japan in the region. Recently, China and India made a joint statement opposing oligarchy in world affairs.”8

25 years after the revisionist coup in China, the CPPh is asking whether China remains socialist or not. And even in recent years, the attitude on this issue remains fluctuating. In his 2014 interview, Sison stated:

“Indeed, the Dengist counterrevolution resulted in the restoration of capitalism in China and its integration in the world capitalist system. By Lenin’s economic definition of modern imperialism, China may qualify as imperialist. Bureaucrat and private monopoly capital has become dominant in Chinese society. Bank capital and industrial capital are merged. China is exporting surplus capital to other countries. Its capitalist enterprises combine with other foreign capitalist enterprises to exploit Chinese labor, third world countries and the global market.

China colludes and competes with other imperialist countries in expanding economic territory, such as sources of cheap labor and raw materials, fields of investments, markets, strategic vantage points and spheres of influence. However, China has not yet engaged in a war of aggression to acquire a colony, a semicolony, protectorate or dependent country. It is not yet very violent in the struggle for a redivision of the world among the big capitalist powers, like the US, Japan, Germany and Italy behaved in joining the ranks of imperialist powers.

It is with respect to China’s contention with more aggressive and plunderous imperialist powers that may be somehow helpful to revolutionary movements in an objective and indirect way. China is playing an outstanding role in the economic bloc BRICS and in the security organization Shanghai Cooperation Organization beyond US control.”9

A wonderful zigzag course that Sison puts in here. According to Lenin's analysis, China may be imperialist, BUT it is not involved in a war of aggression, WHAT causes China's contention to "somehow" help the revolutionary movements. A broad arc that Sison draws from reaction everywhere (to use Lenin's famous phrase) to progressive or helpful to the revolutionary movement. From which tactical principle this attitude comes to a ("possibly") imperialist country we will look at later. But not only in the question of China this kind of absurd or fickle positions prevail.

“Countries that are firmly resolved to remain socialist, like Cuba and the People’s Democratic
Republic of Korea, are under tremendous pressures and threats from the United States.”10

In 1991, not only China is still at the crossroads of being socialist, but Cuba and Korea DPR are as well. A position that in this country rather corresponds to the GCP (revisionist German Communist Party – Deutsche Kommunistische Partei) instead of any organization that calls itself Maoist. But just two years later, exactly these two countries are characterized somewhat differently.

“The global crisis of capitalism now tends to draw simultaneously the attention of the imperialist forces to so many "trouble spots" (the former Yugoslavia, Central Asia, Somalia, Angola, Haiti, Kampuchea, and so on) of their own making even as they wish to focus on and mop up the remaining anti-imperialist states like the People's Democratic of Korea and Cuba and the armed revolutionary movements led by Marxist-Leninist parties.“11

In this question, we would like to know what exactly "anti-imperialist states" shall be. States are always tools of the dictatorship of one class, that means that today they are either tools of the dictatorship of the proletariat (socialist states), the common dictatorship of the revolutionary classes of the people based on the alliance of workers and peasants under the leadership of the proletariat and its party (new democratic states) or the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie (all existing states). Should a state be "anti-imperialist" - against imperialism - then it would have to be socialist or new-democratic. In a detour, with a slightly different choice of words, the CPPh claims here too that Cuba and the DPRK are socialist or new democratic. Or it simply invents a new term that negates the class character of the state and that is simply revisionism. Elsewhere in the 1991 document the concept of "anti-imperialist governments" is introduced:

“It is of great importance that the Philippine revolutionary movement is closely linked with the peoples and revolutionary movements in the neighboring countries in both Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia (China, Korea, Japan, etc.) and in North America as well as with the governments that continue to be or are likely to become anti-imperialist when violent interimperialist rivalries reemerge in the region.”12

Even today, there are supposedly these "anti-imperialist governments", especially in Latin America.

„The anti-imperialist Bolivarian governments of Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador continue to withstand US intervention and subversion.“13

But this is basically the same question: what should that be? How then do "anti-imperialist states" and "anti-imperialist governments" differ? Or is there no "difference in content"? Doesn’t it matter that Lenin drew a very clear line between state and government? Not in our opinion.

Being part of the ICM, the CPPh’s position regarding other communist parties and organizations of the world is naturally of highest interest. In their document of 1993 they state:

“The Communist Party of the Philippines engages mainly in bilateral relations with parties, organizations and movements abroad on the basis of ideological-political understanding of Marxism-Leninism as well as on the basis of anti-imperialist political solidarity. The Party also participates in multilateral seminars and conferences that may forge agreements, resolutions or declarations as a result of consensus and unanimity.“14

In the same document, in which the CPPh declares Marxism-Leninism-Mao-Zedong-Thought as its ideological basis, it explains that it maintains relations with other parties and organizations worldwide on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, thus, not even based on the unity base of the own party.

In 1994, the CPPh published a document entitled "Guidelines in International Relations of the Communist Party of the Philippines" In this document, the party doesn’t mention once the need to truly reconstitute Communist Parties that have the will to actually carry out the revolution in their countries and are free from the different currents of revisionism or, through their large and widespread foreign work, that support that process in the respective countries. Instead, there is a whole bunch of guidelines for working with the existing revisionist parties (these are not labeled as revisionist, but they are the now existing parties that are just revisionist). With these parties, the CPPh engages in intense exchange. Among other things, it participated in the 9th and 10th "International Conference of Marxist-Leninist Parties and Organizations". At these conferences have participated, among others:

- FRG: Marxist-Leninist Party Germany, MLPG (Marxistisch Leninistische Partei Deutschlands, MLPD)

- India: Communist Party India (Marxist-Leninist), CPI (ML)

- Peru: Communist Party Peru (Marxist-Leninist), CPP (ML)

- France: Communist Organization Marxist-Leninist – Proletarian Voice, OCML-VP

At this point, we limit ourselves to these four inveterate revisionist parties and organizations, just to give an impression of which parties and organizations the CPPh sits down with at these conferences. The 10th Conference took place in 2011, at a time when the CPPh had already declared Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as its ideological unity basis.

In the document of 1994, the CPPh also declares:

„It is our view that there is no single party or group of parties in the world today which can presume itself to be the international center of the proletarian revolution or which can decide what constitutes the unity of the international communist movement other than the express common adherence of parties to Marxism-Leninism.“15

It should be remembered that the document "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as Guide to the Philippine Revolution“ appeared the year before. Next, the CPPh writes:

„We recognize the multiplicity of meetings of parties that can gather for study and exchange of experience and views on the basis of ideological, political or geographic affinity. We consider as idealist, futile and counterproductive any effort to impose on these varied meetings or counterpose to them the notion of "international center" or "unity of the international communist movement" from the viewpoint of any single party or any group of parties."16

In the concrete Situation at that time these explanations were directed primarily against the RIM, but they also show the general refusal of the CPPh to promote the unifying process of the ICM and especially the Maoist Parties and Organizations as long as this process doesn’t stand under their direct leadership and initiative. The same thing is happening right in the struggle for a Unified International Maoist Conference. Instead of openly (not in the sense of public) and sincerely carrying out the two-line struggle, other forces are being pushed ahead to sabotage the work of the Maoists in one respective Country. The declaration of the Central Comitee of the Communist Party of Brazil (Red Fraction) on the link between the leadership of the ILPS with a revisionist group in Brazil illuminates exactly this dirty way to carry out the two-line struggle and sabotaging.17

The question is also how the CPPh relates to other people's wars in the world. On this, not so much material can be found in their documents, but once there is something, it is all the more sobering.

“People’s wars are being waged in India and the Philippines along the general line of new democratic revolution with a socialist perspective. They serve as torch bearers of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and the people´s democratic revolution in the transition from the current general crisis of capitalism to the general resurgence of the world proletarian revolution.“18

Accordingly, the point of view of the CPPh is that there are people's wars only in India and in the Philippines. No word from Peru or Turkey. It’s not a secret that we disagree, and as far as we know the rest of the ICM too, especially because the concrete reality can only be denied by repeating the lies of the imperialists and reaction, as well as the woes of miserable traitors. It may be appropriate for the CPPh to explain to the ICM how they came to this conclusion.

In a statement by the CPPh on the anniversary of the New People's Army in 2009, they write about international relations and cooperation:

„12. Contribute to the advance of the global struggle for national liberation, democracy and

In the spirit of revolutionary internationalism, we do our best to advance the people’s democratic revolution. This is our best possible contribution to the common struggle of the peoples of the world against imperialism and reaction and for national liberation, democracy and socialism. We regard the revolutionary struggles and victories of other peoples as our own.

However, we should strive to have concrete mutual support and cooperation with other peoples to the extent that we are capable of. We can share experiences through publications, seminars and conferences. We can exchange cadres in programs of study and training. We must strive to promote international solidarity and contribute to the advance of the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of the world.“19

Here the question of the parties no longer receives any attention, but is reduced to support and cooperation with other peoples and solidarity with their struggles. At this point also the question of the "International League of People's Struggle" (International League of People's Struggles, short ILPS) comes into play. The ILPS was founded in 2001 by several democratic and anti-imperialist organizations. However, in mid-2011, 12 members began to disclose undemocratic and hegemonic aspirations in the ILPS, led by its leader, Jose Maria Sison, following an internal two-line struggle in 2009, mainly within the International Coordinating Committee (ICC) in preparation for a 4. International Assembly of ILPS. That was used by Sison to dissolve leading bodies (the International Coordination Group) and reject any discussion within the ICC. In June 2011, 20 months later, the ILPS's 12 members were asked in two open letters20 to all ILPS members to disclose these events within the leading bodies of the ILPS. In July 2011, they finally settled in a statement on the 10th anniversary of the ILPS21 with Sison and his methods. The 12 signatories of the letters and the declaration are:

G.N. Saibaba – Revolutionary Democratic Front (RDF) - India, Deputy Chairperson of ILPS ICC – Regional Coordinator for South Asia
M. Arkolakis –Committee Against Military Bases and Dependency in Greece - Greece, Vice-Chairperson for External Affairs, Regional Coordinator for Europe
A. Riazi – Democratic Anti-Imperialist Organization of Iranians in Britain – Iran, General Secretary
E. Brunner – Umut Publications – Austria, Deputy General Secretary
R. Scarlatelli – Brazilian centre for support of the Peoples (CEBRASPO) – Brazil, member of the ICC, Regional Coordinator for Latin America
H. Gulum – Belidiye Is 2 Nolu Subesi (Civilian union) – Turkey, member of the ICC
D. Norberg – Collision Course Media, US, member of the ICC
Kali Akuno – Malcolm X Grassroots Movement (MXGM) – US, member of the ICC
Y. Gunes – Federation of Workers from Turkey in Holland (HTIF, Member of ATIK) – Netherlands, member of the ICC
A. Genc – Federation of Workers from Turkey in Germany (ATIF, Member of ATIK) – Germany, member of the ICC
Prof. K. R. Chowdry – Vistapan Virodhi Jan Vikas Andolan – India, member of the ICC
C. Perperidou – Class March – Greece, alternate member of the ICC

A few days after the publication of the open letters and criticism by the 12 ILPS members, Sison responded in a furious statement, repeating his accusation over and over again that the signatories were "sectarians" and "ultra-leftists."22 In the declaration, the 12 signatories are excluded from the ILPS by an administrative measure. Instead of facing the two-line struggle, administrative measures are taken. You can not express in a better way that you are trying to impose your own will on an organization that consists of dozens of organizations from countries around the world. This has contributed to the fact that the ILPS is not represented in some countries and is very weak in some countries today. If you look at the list of members of the ILPS today, between the organizations of the revisionists in different countries (even though we certainly don’t know all the organizations) one organization is particularly noticeable, the "MOVADEF (Base Francia) Comité Solidaridad Peru" from France. This means that the representatives of the right-opportunist line in Peru, whose sole purpose is to destroy the people's war in Peru, with their section in France, has a safe haven in the ILPS instead of getting them isolated and render them harmless.

The CPPh and the People’s War

Shortly after the reestablishment of the party in 1968, the CPPh launched the armed struggle on the Philippines. Despite a rapid initial development, it developed to a stagnant trend after a few years, which was also repeatedly dealt with by the party itself in their documents. This stagnation results above all from a lack of understanding of Maoism and the universal military theory of the proletariat, the people's war, as one of its components.

In "Our Urgent Tasks" some aspects of the CPPh's strategy are further elaborated:

“As early as the successful establishment of the peasant organizing committees over a large area in the countryside, even only some scores of barrios, it is possible to take such a simple and easy first step towards land reform as the reduction of land rent through the systematic withholding of a certain part of the crop without the landlords' knowledge. The campaign to reduce interest rates and eliminate usury; arrange fair prices with the merchants; promote savings, mutual aid and simple exchange of labor and nonpayment of debts under Masagana 99; raise production and productivity; and the like can be pushed.“23

„We should be fully aware of our strength and we should not overstep it. It is understandable if, for considerable period of time in a given group of barrios, the antifeudal movement is capable only of effecting rent reduction and other agrarian reforms […]“24

„Our strategic line in our people's war is to encircle the cities from the countryside until such time that we become capable of moving on the cities from stable revolutionary bases in the countryside. For a long time, we have to develop guerrilla warfare on a nationwide scale so as to convert into our advantage the disadvantage of fighting in a small archipelagic country, whose countryside is so vast in relation to the cities but fragmented into so many islands.“25

„Conditions are not yet ripe for having a well-known central revolutionary base, where the Central Committee of the Party and the general headquarters the New People's Army are seated. We should keep the enemy guessing and ignorant where our principal leaders are in the countryside. But certainly at this stage, we should be firmly taking the steps towards creating such a base in the best possible location.

The emergence of the central revolutionary base presupposes the achievement of a higher stage in our people's war and takes into consideration the development of nationwide guerrilla warfare and international developments involving U.S. imperialism. We still have a long road to traverse in this regard. “26

Here a wrong understanding in questions of the New Power and the base areas is revealed. Especially with regard to the fluidity of the people's war, in which the areas of the New Power can’t be regarded as fixed areas, but change with the ups and downs of the development of the armed struggle. In addition, the necessity of building the new to destroy the old tends to be negated here.

„The main content of the new-democratic revolution is the solution of the land problem, up to the confiscation of landlord property and free distribution of land in the maximum land reform program. But this program is best carried out after the realization of the minimum land reform program on so wide a scale that the potentially unified landlord class and the enemy troops can no longer effectively counter the confiscation of land with the massacre of the peasant leaders and masses. Undoubtedly the best time to carry out the maximum land reform program is when the enemy is defeated over extensive liberated areas or when the entire country is already liberated.27

Moving the implementation of the land reform to strategic equilibrium, strategic offensive, or even post-victory, does mean not consolidating progress, and inevitably leads to a downgrading of the army to a roving bunch because there is no "revolutionary outback" created. This line is confirmed again and again in recent statements of the CPPh:

„To deepen, develop and strengthen the support of the broad masses of peasants, the NPA28 must carry out, as a general policy, the minimum land reform program on a widescale. There must be widespread and sustained municipal, district, provincial or regional level campaigns for reducing land rent, interest rates and fees for irrigation, work animals and farm equipment; raising wages of farm workers; improving farmgate prices for the benefit of peasants; and raising agricultural production and sideline occupations through individual initiative and rudimentary forms of cooperation.

The maximum program of confiscating land from despotic landlords and landgrabbers and distributing this free to peasant tillers should be implemented selectively in areas where the NPA and revolutionary forces are strong enough to carry this out equitably and productively; and where they are capable of frustrating the violent reaction of the enemy.“29

In the early 1990s, the CPPh further hardened these points of view in its line in their orientation campaign:

„We have learned basic principles from the Chinese revolution and Mao̓s works as the Vietnamese revolutionaries have. We have applied them according to our own conditions, never copying dogmatically nor mechanically any pattern of experience. Let us cite some important differences from the Chinese experience in people’s war:

(1) In addition to using the countryside to divide and weaken the forces of the enemy, we have used the archipelagic character of the country to further divide and weaken them.
(2) The Chinese people̓s army used regular mobile warfare and established extensive base areas during the strategic defensive. Like the Vietnamese, we have done so with guerrilla warfare and guerrilla bases and zones.
(3) A whole period of agrarian revolution involving peasant uprisings and confiscation of land preceded the more successful campaign of rent reduction and elimination of usury during the anti-Japanese struggle. We have pursued what we call the minimum program of the agrarian revolution before the maximum program.“30

The CPPh speaks in its documentation of "organs of political power" and "red political power" at various points, but what that exactly is supposed to mean remains in the documentation unfortunately unclear. The definition given in a document titled "Requirements of the Revolutionary United Front" is as follows:

„To realize the worker-peasant alliance, the CPP has built the New People’s Army and the revolutionary peasant movement. Thus, organs of democratic political power have been established. When we speak of Red political power, we mean the people’s government based on the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the proletariat and its party.

The revolutionary united front can exist because in the very first place there is the basic worker-peasant alliance, the realization of the antifeudal class line in the peasant movement, the building of the people’s army as the main component of Red political power and the building of the organs of political power.“31

But how exactly this is realized and how to build political power without New Power or base areas unfortunately remains unanswered.

„Red political power now exists in more than 110 guerrilla fronts with millions of people in substantial portions of 71 of 81 Philippine provinces.“32

What is this about? People's Committees? Which type of people's committees? And if there are several of such types, are they organized in one system? If not, why not? And if so, what does this system look like? This system would then be what we call base areas. This is at least a very mechanical understanding of New Power in the issue of base areas.

Closely connected with the question of New Power is the question of the united front. Because here the emergence of the new state becomes concrete. Chairman Mao specified the importance of the united front as an instrument of revolution as follows:

“Our eighteen years of experience show that the united front and armed struggle are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. The united front is a united front for carrying on armed struggle. And the Party is the heroic warrior wielding the two weapons, the united front and the armed struggle, to storm and shatter the enemy's positions. That is how the three are related to each other.”33

Directly opposite are the basic views of the CPPh:

„At the present stage of the Philippine Revolution, the Party wields two weapons against the enemy. These are armed struggle and the national united front. These are interrelated like the spear and the shield. One serves the other. The national-democratic front ensures the widest possible popular support for armed struggle; it splits the enemy ranks and isolates the worst single enemy at a time. Armed struggle is specifically the weapon for carrying out the central task of the revolution, which is the destruction and overthrow of the enemy rule and the seizure of political power.“34

The front is thus getting only a defensive character. Instead of serving the practice of New Power and mobilizing and organizing the broadest masses of the people for the armed struggle, only supportive activities are done by them. In contrast to the army, it’s demoted to just to a mere shield to ward off the enemy's thrust. In the War of Resistance against the Japanese aggression, Chairman Mao came to realize that the united front is an instrument of the exercise of the revolutionary class dictatorship - the New Power.

“In present-day China, the anti-Japanese united front represents the new-democratic form of state. It is anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist; it is also a united front, an alliance of several revolutionary classes.”35

“The political power we are establishing during the anti-Japanese war is of a united front character. It is the political power of all those who support both resistance and democracy; it is the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the traitors and reactionaries.”36

“The main criterion in judging whether an area is new-democratic in character is whether representatives of the broad masses of the people participate in the political power there and whether this political power is led by the Communist Party. Therefore, united front political power under Communist leadership is the chief mark of a new-democratic society. Some people think that New Democracy can be considered as accomplished only if there is an agrarian revolution like that of the ten years' civil war, but they are wrong.”37

But Chairman Mao's major contribution to the question of the united front is only "right opportunism" for the CPPh:

„As a united front organization, the NDFP38 helps to pave the way for levels of people’s government higher than the village level to arise. But the NDFP is not the people’s government, contrary to the views of the Right opportunists. Neither does it supplant the political leadership of the CPP in the people’s government.“39

Thus, the CPPh negates one of the developments of Marxism by Chairman Mao. The position of the front as a shield, which was already formulated in the party documents in the 1970s, has been consistently developed since then, so that today, in part, it is only spoken of the "legal democratic movement".

„The Party resolutely wields the weapons of revolutionary armed struggle and the national united front to defeat imperialism and such local reactionary classes as the comprador big bourgeoisie and the landlord class. Armed struggle is the main form of struggle while the legal democratic movement is the secondary but indispensable form of struggle.“40

This wrong understanding of the united front as a legal remedy, a remedy of cooperation and alliance forging downgrades this weapon of the revolution to a remedy of negotiation (we will talk about the question of peace negotiations later). This is particularly evident in the fact that the united front is used to form alliances with reactionary forces, as it is also formulated as tactics in several documents of the CPPh.

„The concept and reality of the united front can extend to a formal or informal alliance of the revolutionary forces with sections of the reactionary classes. We have had extensive experience in dealing with local officials of the reactionary government and enlightened landlords and businessmen who comply with the laws of the people’s government on land reform, wages, business, taxation and so on. They have also cooperated with us in mass actions, elections and other events.“41

„When we have reactionary allies, we must describe them as such to the Party rank and file and
explain to them that these are unstable and unreliable allies so that there can be no confusion. We must neither lump them together with the petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie under the category of “bourgeois reformists” nor describe any big comprador-landlord political party or regime as “liberal democratic”. Errors have occurred in this regard.“42

„At certain times, it is good policy to have some cooperation with one reactionary faction against another. At other times, it suffices to let the reactionary factions fight and destroy each other.“43

Again, Chairman Mao: “It is the political power of all those who support both resistance and democracy; it is the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the traitors and reactionaries.”44 We don’t need any more words here.

The difference between the front as the third instrument of the revolution and an alliance is the question of leadership of the Communist Party. In the front, the party leads and retains its independence. In an alliance, conditions are usually negotiated beforehand and quickly lead to dependency, especially if the allies have a stronger apparatus. But having this tactical principle also implies, of course, that if one looks at the united front on a world scale, one can "cooperate" with imperialist countries that are "less bad" than Yankee imperialism, e.g. Chinese imperialism or peace negotiations in which the Norwegian imperialism mediates.

Another aspect of the line of the CPPh regarding the People's War is the rejection of the unified people's war. This significant development for the people's wars in the semi-feudal and semi-colonial countries was systematically developed and applied for the first time by the Communist Party Peru, and extensive documents about it were published since. A unified people's war means that the main arena of armed struggle is at the countryside. But as bureaucratic capitalism is most prevalent in the cities of semi-feudal and semi-colonial countries (of course, there is a also corresponding numerical strength of the proletariat that no Communist Party can ignore in the world today) and the companies of the foreign imperialist finance capital is concentrated there, they thus serve as fortresses of the reaction, here are developed armed actions as well, in order to leave the enemy no quiet hinterland. In Peru, this meant that even in parts of slums of the cities (Lima) New Power could be built. The leadership of the CPPh, on the other hand, has fought systematically to combine armed action with the revolutionary movement in the cities. For a while, especially the legal fight in the cities was emphasized, which should be according to the CPPh only "legal and defensive".

„Partisan warfare is an extension of the people’s war in the countryside. At the same time, it serves the mass movement and the political struggle in the cities. It should not be directly merged or openly linked with open and legal mass struggle in the cities, otherwise the mass movement could become an open target of the enemy’s intrigue and military attack and be deprived of space for maneuver in the legal arena. Directly combining illegal military struggle and open political struggle in the cities over a long period of time is not feasible.

It is a basic guideline for partisan warfare to strictly consider and observe the primarily legal and defensive character of the revolutionary struggle in the cities. As one form of urban struggle, it is only secondary to the legal struggle.“45

Here also arises the question from which source the CPPh takes the "basic guidelines for guerrilla warfare" and on which partisan wars this statement is based. As we have very clearly stated in the last issue of the class standpoint, this is anything but a basic guideline of guerrilla warfare, evidenced mainly by the partisan battles in Europe in World War II.

Later, with the document "Five Kinds of Insurrectionism," the concept of the unified People's War was fought in a systemic way, without, however, for what reason whatsoever, using the term itself. Practical steps in this direction are described as "detrimental to the Party and the revolutionary mass movements"46 Thus today armed struggle and offensive mass fighting in the cities is subordinated to legal struggle, and it is only seen as support of the armed struggle in the countryside, that became necessary because no new power is built up in the country, which serves the revolutionary army as a hinterland and so the development of the people's war stagnates.

„Uprisings in urban areas become possible in due time. They are best undertaken when the people's army has reached the stage of strategic offensive. Premature uprisings must be avoided so as not to jeopardize the legal democratic mass movement. The legal and defensive character of this movement must be respected. Its measure of success lies in ever larger mass mobilizations, solid organizing, militancy and aggravation of the political crisis and ever increasing direct support to the armed struggle in the countryside, and not in running far ahead of the balance of armed power through spontaneous mass violence.“47

Stagnation, however, is not a new phenomenon of the people's war in the Philippines, it has been a trend for decades, as it’s reflected in the goals that the CPPh sets in its documents again and again. In 1988 they formulated the following assessment:

“It is reasonable for the Communist Party of the Philippines to aim for total victory in the national democratic revolution within the next ten years.“48

After failing to reach this goal, a document was published in late 2009 that sets out to achieve strategic equilibrium within five years.

„After more than 40 years of successful people’s war, we consider it of highest importance today to declare our determination to strive within the next five years to make the great advance from the stage of the strategic defensive to the strategic stalemate, fulfilling all the requirements and without skipping any necessary phase. We can look forward to still greater revolutionary possibilities within the next ten years if we carry out successfully the tasks and plans for the next five years.“49

The prerequisites for this are defined as quantitative conditions:

„We must have a plan to increase the number of Red commanders and fighters, units of the NPA and guerrilla fronts from around 120 to 180 in order to cover the rural congressional districts and gain the ability to deploy armed city partisan units in the urban congressional districts.“50

„We must have an organizational plan for increasing the number of Party cadres and members for the purpose of achieving the great advance from the strategic defensive to the strategic stalemate. We need at least 200,000 Party members for this.“51

However, the corresponding document does not explain why these quantitative conditions must be satisfied, which leads to the impression that the quantitative is above the qualitative. This means that not the whole party, army and front are aligned to the achievement of strategic equilibrium, but only more numbers are set up, with which can be played at will. Because it is not reasoned why it is these numbers are exactly. And 2014, the year in which strategic equilibrium should actually be reached, Sison set even higher quantitative requirements in order to achieve strategic equilibrium:

„The perspective and plan of the revolutionary movement is to advance from the stage of strategic defensive to that of the strategic stalemate by increasing the number of guerrilla fronts to 200, CPP membership to 250,000, the number of Red fighters with automatic rifles to 25,000, the membership of the mass organizations by the millions and the strength of the organs of political power at the village, municipal and provincial levels.“52

Of course, again without a reason why this increase was necessary and why the strategic equilibrium was not achieved in the five years. This year, the CPPh celebrates the 50th anniversary of its re-establishment. In these 50 years we have seen no word of self-criticism, no word of the CPPH's statement, which explains why these goals were not achieved, despite the thousands of fighters that are armed with assault rifles. In our opinion, after half a century, it is not arrogant or presumptuous to ask for it. But it may be presumptuous to sing any eulogies now for almost half a century of this state of things. Even today, according to the CPPh, the strategic equilibrium has not yet been reached.

„The people’s war is still in the stage of the strategic defensive and is striving to advance from the middle phase to advanced phase of this stage. It is laying the basis for the strategic stalemate.“53

To make matters worse, according to their own statements, the CPPh currently has about 70,000 members54 This means that there are still 180,000 members to be recruited so that the strategic equilibrium can be achieved if the CPPh's assessment is correct. In this way, the development of the people's war is merely postponed further.

Important in relation to the topic of the people's war is also a question that is an important topic in the ICM today, the issue of the universality of the people's war. Although the CPPh does not often comment on such issues, its position is nevertheless clear in its documentation. It rejects the universality of the people's war. In the mid-1970s they wrote:

„In our country, it is possible to wage a protracted people’s war because we have a relatively wide backward countryside where the bulk of the population is. There are many parts which are relatively far from the enemy’s center and main lines of communications and where the people live basically on their diversified agricultural produce. This situation is completely different from that obtaining in a capitalist country.

In capitalist countries, a civil war is preceded by a long period of parliamentary struggle. To fight there a civil war without the disintegration of at least a great part of the standing army of the bourgeoisie and without the proletariat ready for a general uprising capable of winning decisively within a short period of time is to court disaster for the revolutionary forces. The civil war is mainly conditioned by the fact that the majority of the people are in the cities and is initiated and decided in the major cities where the highly unified economy and the highly developed system of communications are centered. Nationwide victory or defeat in a civil war is faster settled in capitalist countries than in semicolonial and semifeudal countries.“55

This conclusion is made by the CPPh three years after the Chinese Communist Party came to a completely opposite view:

“Violent revolution is the universal principle of proletarian revolution. […] Historical experience shows that the seizure of political power by the proletariat and the oppressed people of a country and the seizure of victory in their revolution are accomplished invariably by the power of the gun; they are accomplished under the leadership of a proletarian party, by acting in accordance with that country’s specific conditions, by gradually building up the people’s armed forces and fighting a people’s war on the basis of arousing the broad masses to action, and by waging repeated struggles against the imperialists and reactionaries. This is true of the Russian revolution, the Chinese revolution, and .the revolutions of Albania, Vietnam, Korea and other countries, and there is no exception.”56

“In the past decades, many Communist Parties have participated in elections and parliaments, but none has set up a dictatorship of the proletariat by such means. Even if a Communist Party should win a majority in parliament or participate in the government, this would not mean any change in the character of bourgeois political power, still less the smashing of the old state machine. The reactionary ruling classes can proclaim the election null and void, dissolve the parliament or directly use violence to kick out the Communist Party. If a proletarian party does no mass work, rejects armed struggle and makes a fetish of parliamentary elections, it will only lull the masses and corrupt itself. The bourgeoisie buys over a Communist Party through parliamentary elections and turns it into a revisionist party, a party of the bourgeoisie – are such cases rare in history?

The proletariat must use the gun to seize political power and must use the gun to defend it.”57

But instead of correcting their view, the CPPh has kept and developed it for over 40 years, as Sison vividly illustrated in an interview in 2014.

„He [Chairman Mao] developed the strategic line of protracted people’s war as the way for the peoples in underdeveloped countries to destroy the power of imperialism and reaction and achieve national and social liberation.“58

An view never mentioned, let alone criticized by the CPPh's advocates in the FRG. One might get the impression that this point of view is even deliberately held back (should it even be known), as it does not fit with the wanna-be radical image that one likes to give. The same applies to the question of participation in the elections.

„We can build Party units within all kinds of legal organizations, including the reactionary organizations and institutions. Without being publicly known as such, these Party units can utilize the legal processes to promote patriotic and progressive ideas and forces. But bourgeois elections, particularly those previously staged by the Marcos fascist regime in 1978 and 1986, have been the occasions for heated debates on whether to “participate” in them or “boycott” them. In this regard, the question properly is: Can the Party utilize the process through Party cadres who are not publicly known as such and allies who take a patriotic and progressive stand?

Regarding these elections, the Party can correctly call them farces as a whole and in essence. At the same time, the Party undertakes measures to use these to promote the national democratic line and encourage progressive parties and candidates. This is in the exercise of revolutionary dual tactics to counter the counterrevolutionary dual tactics of the enemy. The boycott error of 1986 was a major sectarian error separating the advanced section of the masses from the middle and backward sections of the antifascist mass movement and imposing the Party’s puristic will on the legal progressive mass organizations for the duration of the electoral campaign period of December 1985 to February 7, 1986. The boycott decision of 1978, which practically remained unimplemented, was another major error insofar as it led to developments divisive among cadres and damaging to the Party organization.“59

In our opinion the participation in the bourgeois election respectively the question of the election boycott has become a question of strategic significance for the proletarian revolution. In different documents in the past we emphasized the significance of the election boycott.60 Of course, one may disagree, but what the CPPh is doing here is a whole new level of what Lenin called parliamentary cretinism. Under a fascist regime - defined by themselves – thus, the open rule of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie without the bourgeois democratic mask, they say that it would be right to participate in elections. What do the alleged friends of the Philippine Revolution have to say about that?

One last but not unimportant question is the question of peace negotiations. The first peace negotiations between the CPPh and the Philippine government took place in 1986. Since then, more than 40 talks have been held between representatives of both sides. Since the 1990s, common declarations have been published again and again. These include, in particular, the Hague Declaration of 1992 and the Breukelen Declaration of 1994. The words of a "just and lasting peace" also crop up again and again in the statements and documents of the CPPh. About the peace negotiations, the CPPh wrote:

„The CPP, NPA and the NDFP have always made clear the following: 1) that in entering into the peace negotiations with the GRP, they continue to adhere to the line of new-democratic revolution as the line for a just and lasting peace and 2) that the peace negotiations, as properly conducted by the authorized negotiating panel, is a form of legal struggle, which is subordinate to the revolutionary armed struggle or even to the legal democratic mass struggles.“61

That means that the peace negotiations are a form of struggle and therefore part of the line of the CPPh. The question of the subordination of the legal form of struggle under the armed struggle is in the end not the crucial question, but that the party must lead everything with a correct line. The phrase "subordinate to the armed struggle" ultimately distracts from this question and reminds of how all the militarist organizations have handled and handle the issue of the "armed arm" and the "political arm". Such as the Provisional IRA62, the "political arm" Sinn Féin was supposed to provide "political support" and appear in the peace negotiations, but was subordinated to the "military arm". In fact, as it is known, Sinn Féin takes over the real control and uses the "military arm" to exert pressure by armed actions if the peace negotiations do not go well. And in the end the capitulation was at the negotiating table. Parallels to this can also be seen in various statements by Jose Maria Sison, as at the beginning of this year:

„What the NPA can do in order to compel or persuade the GRP to resume the peace negotiations is to carry out successfully the announced plan of the CPP to intensify tactical offensives against armed units of the AFP, PNP and auxiliary forces and to punish notorious human rights violators, local tyrants, land grabbers, drug lords and other notorious criminals. With or without Duterte as president, the GRP will decide to negotiate peace when the people´s war can inflict larger casualties on enemy troops.“63

Especially after Duterte was elected to the Philippine president in 2016 the was again a lot of talking and negotiation about peace. A total of four rounds of negotiations were held before the talks were ended by the government with Duterte at the top in late 2017. During this period, the slogans "People‘s War for just peace" and "People's War is People’s Peace" appeared everywhere in the CPPh propaganda. In this question, we are with the comrades of demvolkedienen.org who wrote in 2017, after this slogan even appeared at a demonstration in Berlin: “People's War is the war of the people. That is why it is called People's War. War is not peace. The people will only know lasting peace in communism. That is why People's War until communism is the correct slogan.”64

Even though the negotiations were canceled at the end, very concrete things were discussed in the four rounds of talks. There were joint working groups on the one hand to social and economic and on the other to political and constitutional reforms. The concrete future structure of the Philippine state was also discussed, favoring a federal structure65. These no longer seem to have much to do with people's war, but focus on integration into the old state. The revolution is being canceled for a few reforms of the old state that may address some of the short-term demands of the day by the oppressed masses, but leave their fundamental question, the issue of conquering power, unsolved. In the end, it was the reaction in Duterte's person that caused the negotiations to break, therefore the way of describing him in the CPPh’s propaganda was changed.

First he came „from a long history of friendship and cooperation with the revolutionary forces and progressive mass movement in Davao“66 (so much about describing reactionary allies as such). Then he was allegedly provided with wrong information by “peace saboteurs”, pushed to end the negotiations and call the NPA67 “terroristic”. After the final cancellation of the negotiation the description of Duterte changed completely. Now he is called “crazy, “sociopath and psychopath”, “drug addict”68 and wants to “establish a fascist dictatorship”69 We would be brief and say Duterte is a reactionary and lackey of imperialism. We could certainly say more about the question of peace negotiations and armed struggle, but let us leave it with these brief remarks.

Some concluding words

We have cited much and in detail from the documents of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and we believe that it was necessary, as these documents and the positions held in them are almost unknown in the FRG, Despite the relative prominence (at least in matters of existence) of the people’s war in the Philippines in the revolutionary movement in this country. It also seems to be partly affected from the general stupefaction that has taken place in recent years through Instagram and Co., so that the power of images becomes a negative thing, if it is not dealt not at all with the content of those images or what’s behind it. Although the images of the thousands of fighters of the New People's Army are known with just as many assault rifles, how many actually read the documents of the party behind them and deal with their line and their points of view? What remains are the pictures, what is missing is the content. And consequently no criticism is developed, as it should be among communists. This power of images is not a new phenomenon, it was the same before the capitulation of the FARC in Colombia, from which the images of the armed militants were always propagated and received, without even a word the patriarchal views that were represented by them was mentioned, such as the "preservation of femininity.”

We are firmly convinced that the Communists of all countries, as the vanguard of the working class, which is a class worldwide, must always learn from each other and exchange experiences. But, of course, they are ultimately responsible for accepting or rejecting good or bad advice. In this sense, we must ask ourselves what we can learn as proletarian revolutionaries in an imperialist country from the Communist Party of the Philippines. The answer is, according to the above explanations, unfortunately very sobering. Revisionism is the main danger for the Marxists, that means today for the Marxist-Leninist Maoists, in the world and the CPPh does not take a firm stand against the revisionists in the world. On the contrary, it even openly supports different revisionist parties and organizations, and even regimes, and cooperates with a number of revisionist parties and organizations in the imperialist countries. It reduces the revolution in the imperialist countries to a mainly parliamentary struggle with a short decisive battle in a "civil war". If the proletarian revolutionaries in this country listened to the CPPh's advice, they could directly liquidate their work and join the MLPD. Then maybe the CPPh would cooperate with them instead of just supporting the right liquidators in the FRG. The CPPh does not want and does not need a Maoist Communist Party in the FRG, because its party already exists with the MLPD in this country. It corresponds exactly to the line of the CPPh for the revolution in the imperialist countries. They, or some of the elements associated with them, seem to have a penchant for working with the most retrograde elements of the revolutionary (or even non-revolutionary) movement in one country.

Regardless of the necessarily sobering results of looking at the reality of the Philippine Revolution today, we are revolutionary optimists. As such, we are convinces that the people’s war in the Philippines will ultimately be victorious. But for that the existing limitations mus be overcome. The Filipino people and their most progressive representative will ensure so. We are certain of that.


1 José Carlos Mariátegui, „Anti-imperialist viewpoint“, 1929
2 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Constitution and Program“, 2016, page 44
3 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Constitution and Program“, 2016, page 10
4About the world communist movement, the fact that i was a man who dedicated his whole life to the revolution still makes me feel more proud of the growth of international communism and labor movements, and it even gives me the sense of divergence that exists today between the brother Parties. I hope our party makes every effort to contribute to the restoration of unity among brother Parties that are based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism reasoning and feeling.”
5 Interview with Jose Maria Sison, „The Communist Party of the Philippines on Maoism, New Democratic Revolution, China & the Current World“, conducted by the „New Culture Magazine“ der Communist Reconstruction Union of Brazil, 2014, our highlights
6 If the definition is not important, why talk about Marxism at all, why talk about Leninism? We could then talk about "Marx's Thought" "Lenin's Thought," "proletarian thought," etc. But that's not how it is. We talk about Marxism as science. And as known, definitions in science play an indispensable role.
7 Communist Party Peru „On Marxism-Leninism-Maoism“, 1988
8 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Carry the Revolution Forward“, 1991, our highlights
9 Interview with Jose Maria Sison, „The Communist Party of the Philippines on Maoism, New Democratic Revolution, China & the Current World“, conducted by the „New Culture Magazine“ der Communist Reconstruction Union of Brazil, 2014, our highlights
10 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Carry the Revolution Forward“, 1991
11 Communist Party of the Phillipines, „Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as Guide to the Philippine Revolution“, November 1993, our highlights
12 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Carry the Revolution Forward“, 1991
13 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Intensify the people’s war against the tyranny and terrorism of the US-Duterte fascist regime“, March 2018
14 Communist Party of the Phillipines, „Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as Guide to the Philippine Revolution“, November 1993
15 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Guidelines in International Relations of the Communist Party of the Philippines“, 1994
16 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Guidelines in International Relations of the Communist Party of the Philippines“, 1994
17 See Central Committee of the Communist Party of Brazil (Red Fraction), "On the incidents of the 1st of May in Berlin, internationalism and the two lines struggle for the unity of the International Communist Movement " June 2018, available at demvolkedienen.org
18 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Intensify the people’s war against the tyranny and terrorism of the US-Duterte fascist regime“, March 2018
19 Communist Party of the Philippines, „CPP Statement on NPA Anniversary: Win Greater Victories in the People’s War“ , 29. März 2009
20 First open letter to the members of the ILPS from 26.06.2011; Second open letter to the members of the ILPS on 28.06.2011; both letters are available in English on bannedthought.net
21 „On the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the founding of the ILPS“, available on bannedthought.net
22 See. „Resolution in Defense of the ILPS against Sectarianism and Sabotage“, Juli 2011
23 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Our Urgent Tasks“, probably 1974
24 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Our Urgent Tasks“ probably 1974
25 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Our Urgent Tasks“, probably 1974, our highlights
26 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Our Urgent Tasks“, probably 1974
27 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as Guide to the Philippine Revolution“, November 1993
28 New People‘s Army
29 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Intensify the people’s war against the tyranny and terrorism of the US-Duterte fascist regime“, March 2018
30 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors“, July 1992
31 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Requirements of the Revolutionary United Front“, April 1998
32 Interview with Jose Maria Sison, „The Communist Party of the Philippines on Maoism, New Democratic Revolution, China & the Current World“, conducted by the „New Culture Magazine“ der Communist Reconstruction Union of Brazil, 2014
33 Mao Zedong, “Introducing The Communist”, 1939
34 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Specific Characteristics of our People's War“, December 1974, our highlights
35 Mao Zedong „On New Democracy“, 1940
36 Mao Zedong „On the Question of Political Power in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas“, 1940
37 Mao Zedong „Conclusions on the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught“, 1940
38 National Democratic Front of the Philippines
39 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Requirements of the Revolutionary United Front“, April 24, 1998
40 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Constitution and Program“, 2016, p. 12
41 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Carry the Revolution Forward“, 1991
42 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Carry the Revolution Forward“, 1991
43 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Brief Review of the History of the Communist Party of the Philippines“, Dezember 1988
44 Mao Zedong: „On the Question of Political Power in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas“, 1940
45 Communist Party of the Philippines, „On the Concept of the “Pol-Mil” Struggle“, March 1991
46 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Five Kinds of Insurrectionism“
47 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Constitution and Program“, 2016, p. 50
48 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Brief Review of the History of the Communist Party of the Philippines“, December 1988
49 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Strive to Make a Great Advance in the People’s War for New Democracy“, December 2009
50 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Strive to Make a Great Advance in the People’s War for New Democracy“, December 2009
51 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Strive to Make a Great Advance in the People’s War for New Democracy“, December 2009
52 Interview with Jose Maria Sison, „The Communist Party of the Philippines on Maoism, New Democratic Revolution, China & the Current World“, conducted by the „New Culture Magazine“ der Communist Reconstruction Union of Brazil, 2014
53 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Constitution and Program“, 2016
54 See Communist Party of the Philippines, „Communiqué of the Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Philippines“, March 2017
55 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Specific Characteristics of our People's War“, 1974, our highlights
56 Peking Review „Long Live the Victory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat“, Number 12, 1971
57 Peking Review „Long Live the Victory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat“, Number 12, 1971
58 Interview with Jose Maria Sison, „The Communist Party of the Philippines on Maoism, New Democratic Revolution, China & the Current World“, conducted by the „New Culture Magazine“ der Communist Reconstruction Union of Brazil, 2014
59 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Carry the Revolution Forward“, 1991
60 See Klassenstandpunkt #14 „Die strategische Bedeutung des Wahlboykotts“ („The strategic significance of the election boycott“)
61 Communist Party of the Philippines, „Requirements of the Revolutionary United Front“, April 1998, our highlights
62 Even if it is not a Communist Party, our point remains correct.
63 Jose Maria Sison, „On the question of Jasig and what the NPA can do to compel the GRP to resume Peace Negotiations“, Februar 2018
64 http://www.demvolkedienen.org/index.php/en/europa/1203-regarding-the-lll-demonstration-2017
65 See„Joint Statement on the Successful Third Round of Formal Talks Between the GRP and NDFP in Rome, Italy“, 25. Januar 2017
66 See Liberation „Moving the Peace Talks Forward“
67 See Liberation „Moving the Peace Talks Forward“
68 Interview with Jose Maria Sison from „fisch-und-vogel.de (only available in German), February 2018
69 Jose Maria Sison, „Duterte’s repetitive termination of the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations“, August 2018